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Brand as  
Information  Intermediary 
Kishanthi Parella† 
This essay examines how brand names facilitate exchanges 
that would not otherwise occur in the global marketplace because 
of asymmetries of information between buyers and sellers. A 
transnational corporation facilitates exchanges by providing 
information through its brand that persuades Group A (buyers) 
to exchange with Group B (third party suppliers). Recognizing 
the information functions leads to two important implications. 
First, brand corporations may need to disclose their 
intermediary role to consumers in order to reduce risks to 
consumers, workers, and other actors in the supply chain.  
Second, the type of disclosure matters. While different 
disclosure strategies may prove similarly effective at shining a 
light on conditions in supply chains, some disclosure strategies 
involve greater brand damage and are therefore more likely to 
incentivize brand corporations to do something about conditions 
in their supply chains. Therefore, viewing corporations as 
information intermediaries provides us with a useful lens to 
evaluate competing strategies for information regulation 
concerning the supply chain. 
Introduction 
An information intermediary is a party who informs one group of 
actors (Group A) of the characteristics, capacities, and other relevant 
information of another group of actors (Group B). Information 
intermediaries matter because in a market  characterized by 
asymmetries of information, Group A may not exchange with Group 
B but for the information that intermediaries supply.  
In this essay, I suggest that in many global supply chains the 
function of a transnational corporation is best conceived of as an 
information intermediary. Many corporations have outsourced several 
functions to one or more third party suppliers: manufacturing, 
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Phil. in International Relations, University of Cambridge; B.A., 
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research and development, marketing, sales, and customer support.1 
We may not purchase the products from a third-party supplier 
because we are unfamiliar with it and cannot verify the quality of the 
product before purchase; these suppliers do not have a brand that we 
trust. Therefore, we rely on the information conveyed by the 
transnational corporation through its brand when we make our 
purchasing decisions. The transnational corporation acts as an 
intermediary that facilitates market exchanges by providing 
information through its brand that persuades Group A (buyers) to 
exchange with Group B (third party suppliers).2  
Recognizing the information intermediary role of corporations has 
at least two important implications. First, brand corporations may 
need to disclose their intermediary role to consumers in order to 
prevent these consumers from suffering “identity harms” that result 
from risks in the supply chain.3 Second, the intermediary role played 
by brand corporations can potentially hurt more than just consumers. 
Practices that persist in supply chains also harm workers in overseas 
sites.4 The way corporations disclose information can incentivize them 
to deter wrongdoing in the supply chain.5 Their willingness to do so 
depends on the incentives created in the regulations that apply to 
them. While different disclosure strategies may prove effective at 
shining a light on conditions in supply chains, some strategies might 
prove better at incentivizing intermediary cooperation than others. 
Therefore, viewing corporations as information intermediaries provides 
us with a useful lens to evaluate competing strategies for information 
regulation concerning the supply chain. 
I. Understanding the Information Role of 
Transnational Brand Corporations: The Maghribi 
Traders Re-Visited 
Many American household names do not make the goods we 
associate with them. Instead, they outsource a variety of traditional 
 
1. See Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. 
L. REV. 
747, 749 (2014) (listing functions outsourced by international businesses). 
2. See Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic 
Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 1165, 1170 (2002). 
3. See Sarah Dadush, Identity Harms, 89 COLO. L. REV. ___(forthcoming 
2018) (defining and discussing “identity harms”), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990526. 
4. See Parella, supra note 1, at 801 (brief discussion of intermediary 
reporting affecting workers’ rights).   
5. See Parella, supra note 1, at 807 (brief discussion of intermediary 
reporting on supply chain).  
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business functions to third-party suppliers, including manufacturing, 
customer service, marketing, sales, design, and research and 
development.6 The corporation may outsource these functions to one 
or, more likely, several actors both here in the United States and 
abroad.7   
For example, while Nike sells tens of millions of athletic shoes in 
the United States every year, “all of the firm’s manufacturing 
operations are conducted overseas.”8Additionally, Nike “never 
relocated domestic production abroad, . . . because the firm actually 
originated by importing shoes from Japan. It has subcontracted nearly 
all of its production’ overseas ever since.”9  The result is that “[i]n the 
United States, Nike has developed essentially as a design, distribution, 
and marketing enterprise.”10 As one of Nike’s vice-presidents aptly 
stated, “‘We are marketers and designers’” -  “‘[w]e don’t know the 
first thing about manufacturing.’”11 
For these reasons, we usually think about the functions overseas 
suppliers provide to transnational corporations as opposed to 
exploring the functions that transnational corporations provide to 
overseas suppliers. It is also important, however, to understand the 
benefits that flow from the brand corporation to the overseas supplier 
(besides payment).   
Consider a hypothetical involving Acme, a US-based corporation, 
that outsources all of the functions necessary to support its primary 
product, Widget, to a third party, Overseas Supplier. In an extreme 
example of outsourcing, assume that the latter organization designs 
Widget (including improvements), invests in R&D concerning 
Widget’s technology, manufactures, markets, and sells Widget in the 
United States.  
 
6. Parella, supra note 1, at 749.   
7. See Samuel Palmisano, The Globally Integrated Enterprise, 85 FOREIGN 
AFF. 127, 131 (2006) (“Now the spread of outsourcing is encouraging 
companies to view themselves as an array of specialized components: 
procurement, manufacturing, research, sales, distribution, and so on. . . . 
The corporation, then, is emerging as a combination of various functions 
and skills-some tightly bound and some loosely coupled-and it integrates 
these components of business activity and production on a global basis 
to produce goods and services for its customers.”). 
8. Miguel Korzeniewicz, Commodity Chains and Marketing Strategies: Nike 
and the Global Athletic Footwear Industry, in COMMODITY CHAINS & 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 247, 252 (Gary Gereffi & Miguel Korzeniewicz eds., 
1994). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
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Overseas Supplier may not be able to sell in the US market 
without Acme due to information asymmetries or “the lemons 
problem.”  George Akerlof explained that information asymmetries 
often characterize market exchanges because a potential buyer knows 
less about the product than the product’s seller.12 These asymmetries 
increase the risk that the seller may exploit the buyer by selling him a 
product he would not want if he had known the truth before the 
sale.13 These asymmetries also occur in the sale of goods in the global 
marketplace: A buyer in one country may refuse to purchase a good 
from a seller in another country because the former cannot evaluate 
the quality of the good prior to sale.14 In these situations, 
transnational corporations serve as critical information intermediaries 
by addressing information asymmetry problems in cross-border sales – 
information problems that would prevent sales in the absence of the 
information intermediary functions performed by transnational 
corporations.  
In order to appreciate the significance, consider how information 
asymmetries determine the likelihood of sales in two hypotheticals. In 
Hypothetical 1, a transnational corporation based in the United 
States, Acme, sells Widget. Buyer is excited to purchase this new 
product, but wary because he cannot verify its properties prior to sale 
(even a cursory examination at a store will not reveal all potential 
hidden defects). Buyer runs the risk that Acme may sell him an 
inferior product; however, Buyer has access to other resources that 
give him greater confidence in the transaction because he (a) 
purchased from Acme previously (prior dealings), (b) trusts Acme 
based on available information (reputation), or (c) feels confident in 
post-sale assurances that reduce the risk of opportunism, such as 
return policies, warranties, and dispute resolution procedures. For 
these reasons, he decides to go ahead with the purchase of Widget 
from Acme. 
Now consider how the information problem grows if Buyer does 
not purchase a Widget from Acme, but instead purchases it directly 
from Overseas Supplier. In Hypothetical 2, Buyer is not familiar with 
Overseas Supplier, having never purchased from it.  Buyer can find 
very little information about Overseas Supplier online and there are 
very few customer reviews of Widget. Overseas Supplier sells directly 
from another country and its website states that any disputes arising 
from product sales will be arbitrated in that country as the exclusive 
 
12. George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488, 489 (1970). 
13. See Akerlof supra note 12, at 489-490 (illustration of effects of 
asymmetry of information between buyer and seller). 
14. See Gillette, supra note 2, at 1169-70 (discussion of information 
asymmetry in global context).  
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forum. Unsurprisingly, Buyer feels less willing to enter into an 
exchange with Overseas Supplier because he lacks the information 
that an exchange with Acme would make available.15 He does not 
have any previous dealings with Overseas Supplier and is unaware of 
its reputation. Additionally, Overseas Supplier’s return policy requires 
returns to its overseas location and disputes are subject to mandatory 
arbitration before a foreign tribunal. He therefore foregoes the 
exchange (despite how badly he wants a Widget!!).  
This illustrates the challenge information asymmetries in cross-
border sales presents. A buyer in one country knows very little about 
the goods offered for sale in another or about the merchants offering 
it. The enforcement sanctions for opportunism are also weak or 
insufficient to assuage the buyer, who may need to incur high costs to 
verify product quality or protect his interests after the parties 
complete the sale.   
These problems are not new. Avner Greif famously studied 
information problems encountered by Maghribi traders in long-
distance trade in the 11th century.16 These traders sold their goods 
across long distances through agents.17 This presented an information 
problem because these agents operated distantly and beyond the 
direct supervision of the merchants; therefore, the latter undertook 
the risk that the former may take advantage of them.18  To address 
this risk, the traders established coalitions that served as information 
intermediaries regarding the behavior of agents: the coalition had the 
capability to disseminate information regarding agent conduct rapidly 
throughout the coalition, thereby putting agents on notice that news 
of any opportunistic behavior would reach the relevant merchant.19 As 
an information intermediary, the coalition helped to correct 
information asymmetries between agent and trader across greater 
distances and gave the latter greater confidence in his transactions 
with agents.20 
 
15. See Gillette, supra note 2, at 1166-67 (“[T]he need for buyers and sellers 
to trust each other where compliance with contractual terms cannot 
readily be verified ex ante or enforced ex post diminishes the likelihood 
of trade. Thus, even while electronic commerce reduces search costs and 
transaction costs of putting together willing buyers and sellers, its full 
potential cannot be realized if parties fear that trading partners will 
perform opportunistically because remedies for breach or chiseling are 
unavailable.”).  
16. Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on 
the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989). 
17. Id. at 864-65. 
18. Id. at 865.  
19. Id. at 867-69; Gillette, supra note 2 at 1177. 
20. Greif, supra note 16 at 879-80. 
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This example illustrates how information intermediaries play vital 
roles in facilitating exchanges across great distances. The information 
asymmetry between a Maghribi merchant and his agent is similar to 
the information asymmetry between Overseas Supplier and Buyer 
because the latter fears opportunistic behavior by the former, 
operating at great distance from himself. Buyer is reluctant to 
transact with Overseas Supplier without some type of information 
intermediary to supply relevant information, especially concerning the 
risk of opportunism. With the Maghribi merchant, the coalition 
transmitted information regarding agent behavior.21 With the Buyer, 
brand serves as the information intermediary.   
Consider Hypothetical 3, where Overseas Supplier and Acme work 
together. Overseas Supplier undertakes all production functions for 
Widget.  However, Acme stamps its name to every Widget that 
Overseas Supplier makes and sells. This stamp is key. It assuages 
Buyer’s concern and he is willing to buy a Widget now even though 
he refused to do so in Hypothetical 2. These two hypotheticals are 
almost identical except for one difference: the Acme stamp. 
In order to understand the function of the Acme stamp, we need 
to change our perspective on who we exchange with when we 
purchase goods made in overseas supply chains. In Hypothetical 3, 
Buyer may believe that his primary exchange partner is Acme (and 
he may be oblivious to Overseas Supplier). However, in reality, his 
exchange partner is Overseas Supplier.  
So, if Buyer primarily exchanges with Overseas Supplier, what 
role does Acme have? Acme is in the business of selling informational 
products.  Here, information products do not refer to information 
technology or related products and services. Instead, information 
products refers to the provision of information concerning a product 
or service and the associated merchant or service provider. Brand is 
an information product because it tells us certain things about 
Widget, for example: reliability, desirability, popularity, affordability, 
etc. This informational product helps to address the information 
asymmetry between a US buyer and an overseas merchant, thereby 
facilitating the exchange between the two. By branding the product 
made overseas with an Apple logo or a Nike swoosh, the corporations 
“rent” their reputation to Overseas Supplier in order to facilitate 
exchange between it and a domestic buyer.22 Without that 
 
21. Greif, supra note 16, at 867-68.  
22. See Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills 
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE LAW J. 239, 289-90 (1984) Yuri Mishina, 
Emily S. Block, and Michael J. Mannor, The Path Dependence of 
Organizational Reputation: How Social Judgment Influences 
Assessments of Capability & Character, 33 STRAT. MGMT. J. 459, 459-
460 (2012); Ronald Sims, Toward a Better Understanding of 
Organizational Efforts to Rebuild Reputation following an Ethical 
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intermediary role, Buyer may be unwilling to exchange with Overseas 
Supplier.  
II. Implications For Information Regulation 
 
What significance does recognizing the information intermediary 
role of corporations in modern exchanges have?  The remainder of this 
essay explores two questions: (a) what is the nature of brand 
responsibility in those exchanges when the primary role of the 
corporation is to bring buyers and suppliers together, and (b) can we 
borrow lessons from the regulation of information intermediaries in 
other exchange contexts in order to regulate transnational supply 
chains more effectively?  
A. The Responsibility of a Name 
When we shop, we often make decisions based on brand names 
that signify certain attributes to us: quality, sustainability, 
desirability, affordability, and even community. Brand can serve as a 
beacon, attracting us to certain products over others. As discussed 
above, in some contexts, the primary function of a brand is 
information intermediary by bringing together sellers and buyers who 
may not otherwise exchange. In these circumstances, do brand 
companies need to disclose their intermediary role and, if so, why?  
Consider a hypothetical where Buyer purchases a Widget from 
Acme because Acme has an established reputation for product quality 
and affordability. Buyer later learns that Acme had outsourced its 
manufacturing tasks for Widget to a variety of third-party suppliers, 
but Widget continues to perform exactly as Buyer expected and 
provides the best deal around. Is Buyer entitled to know the true 
identity of her exchange partners and the nature of the exchange?  
There are two reasons why Buyer is entitled to this information 
disclosure: consent and risks.  First, Buyer did not consent to the 
exchange that occurred. She received the good that she contracted for 
but not under the conditions she imagined. This more complex 
 
Scandal, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 453, 455 (2009)(“[T]he value of a good 
reputation continues to grow largely because of the competitive 
advantage and market differentiation it delivers - higher sales generated 
by satisfied customers and their referrals; relationships with the right 
strategic and business partners; ability to attract develop and retain the 
best talent; benefit of the doubt by stakeholders if crisis strikes; spread 
of positive word of mouth; potential to raise capital and share price; and 
in some cases, the option to charge premium prices.  Also, in an age of 
regulatory watchdogs, a positive reputation can improve relationships 
with government officials and regulators.”); Charles Fombrun, The 
Building Blocks of Corporate Reputation in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE REPUTATION 104-107 (Barnett & Pollock eds., 2012). 
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transaction involves more actors, many of whom are not subject to 
the direct control of Acme. Her assumptions of Acme’s brand – the 
information upon which she made the decision to purchase – may not 
extend to all those actors.  Buyer did not consent to an exchange with 
third party suppliers; she consented to an exchange with Acme. It’s 
not that Buyer would not have consented to exchanging with third 
party suppliers; the issue is that she, in fact, did not.  
Buyer entered into the exchange for Widget based on threshold 
information that Acme supplied to Buyer based on its brand. The 
brand provided Buyer the information she needed in order to go 
ahead with the exchange. However, if Buyer had known that her 
exchange involved a variety of third-party suppliers who were her 
exchange partners, and not Acme, Buyer remains in an information 
deficit.  She lacks information regarding characteristics of the 
exchange and she may not have consented to it without first 
obtaining that additional information.  But Buyer does not know 
what she does not know because the brand masks the information 
problem. It is not the identity of the counterparty that determines 
whether Buyer would go ahead with the exchange but the extent of 
the information that Buyer has before she consents to the exchange. 
The second reason it matters to Buyer that she knows the 
intermediary role played by Acme is that the actual exchange exposed 
her to unique risks of which she had no awareness at contracting. The 
first risks that come to mind are ones that concern the attributes of 
the product purchased: quality, performance, appearance, safety, etc. 
Since Acme did not actually manufacture the product, perhaps the 
product falls short of our expectations for it. However, corporations 
like Acme have measures in place to address disappointed consumers 
regarding the product sold.  
Product risks are not the only risks that arise in the supply chain. 
Specifically, global supply chains can be sites of significant human 
rights abuses.23 These conditions create a number of physical, 
economic, and cultural risks for the men, women, and children who 
work in these supply chains or whose lives the operations of Acme or 
its third-party suppliers negatively impact.24   
While those working for or living near supply chain sites bear the 
brunt of these risks, supply chains also create a different set of risks 
for consumers far away – consumers like Buyer. Specifically, 
consumers who purchase goods manufactured in vulnerable supply 
chains may unwittingly contribute to those conditions without 
knowing these risks when they purchase the product. When 
 
23. Parella, supra note 1, at 774-775. 
24. See Parella, supra note 1, at 769-784 (discussing various human rights 
concerns that stem from Apple’s global commerce).  
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consumers later learn of their role, they suffer a type of harm Sarah 
Dadush terms “identity harms”: 
Identity harm refers to the distress experienced by consumers who 
learn that a company with which they transacted has failed to honor 
its environmental or social promises. It arises when consumers 
discover that, as a result of some form of deception, they have become 
unwittingly implicated in a commercial scheme that causes harm to 
other beings—the planet (its atmosphere, oceans, rivers, animals, etc.) 
or fellow humans.25 
According to Dadush, these harms are especially acute when 
“conscious consumers” purchase products based on more than price 
and physical attributes but also because of “environmental and social-
environmental impact.”26  When a “green consumer” who cares about 
the environment purchases a “clean-fuel car,” she expects that her 
purchasing decision is contributing to a cleaner environment (or at 
least not damaging it).  When she later learns that the “clean-fuel 
car” actually pollutes the environment more than she expected, she 
suffers an “identity harm” because of her unwitting complicity in 
perpetuating the very problem that she had set out to alleviate 
through her purchase. 
Buyer may still suffer an identity harm even if she is not a 
“conscious consumer.”  Widget may not be particularly 
environmentally friendly and, even if it is, Buyer may not have 
purchased it for those “green” reasons. But simply because Buyer did 
not intend to improve the environment through her purchasing 
decision does not mean that she intends to contribute to its 
destruction or that she is unaffected it turns out that her purchasing 
decisions had that effect. She bought Widget without realizing the 
risks of negative impact and the possibility of “identity harm.” She 
may or may not have purchased Widget had she known the real 
nature of the exchange and the risks to her (and third-party victims 
in the supply chain). She needed more information to assess that 
purchasing decision in light of those risks.  
One may object to this conclusion by claiming that most people 
are not like Buyer. They care about the quality of the product 
purchased and not the nature of the exchange; they are indifferent as 
to whether the exchange involves only Acme or 100 suppliers. Supply 
chain information does not matter to them.   
Admittedly, some consumers may be indifferent the nature of the 
exchange and the risks that may arise. However, other consumers 
have recently sued companies for failing to alert them at the point of 
 
25. Dadush, supra note 3 at 3.  
26. See id. (defining conscious consumers and their connections to identity 
harms).  
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purchase of the risks of human rights abuses in different types of 
supply chains.   
For example, in Hodsdon v. Mars, plaintiffs allege that Mars uses 
child labor in its cocoa supply chain but fails to disclose that risk to 
consumers at the point of purchase.27 These plaintiffs claim that 
“[h]ad consumers known the truth, they would not have purchased or 
paid as much for Mars Chocolate Products.”28 Similarly, in Sud v. 
Costco, plaintiffs brought a lawsuit alleging that the food giant failed 
to disclose to consumers that its products could have been produced 
with slave labor.29 It is important to note that the product that the 
consumers received corresponded to their beliefs concerning what they 
were buying: they wanted a chocolate bar and they got a chocolate 
bar. The product did not change or disappoint. Instead, their 
objections concern the nature of the exchange and the risks involved 
in that exchange – risks of which they were unaware at the time of 
purchase. These complaints reinforce Dadush’s identification of 
“identity harms” and consumer demands for information regarding 
the nature of the exchange and not just the product purchased.30  
 
B. Intermediary Liability: How Information is Disclosed Matters 
Information disclosure does not only affect consumer behavior. It 
also can exert significant influence on the behavior of corporations like 
Acme depending on the manner in which this information is disclosed. 
There are various approaches that public actors can adopt in order to 
improve information regarding conditions in the supply chain. Each of 
these information mechanisms can inform the public about conditions 
in Acme’s supply chain. 
However, information is not an end in itself. The act of revealing 
information can encourage change by the actor doing the revealing. 
That is why the designers of mandatory disclosure laws hope that 
forcing corporations to disclose their due diligence practices in supply 
chains will lead to an upgrade of those practices. This organizational 
change differs from the sharing of information through disclosure. In 
other words, information disclosure involves two different functions: 
information function (adding to the supply of information available 
about supply chains) and an organizational change function (relating 
 
27. Class Action Complaint for Violation of California Consumer Protection 
Laws & Demand for Jury Trial at 4-6, Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc. et al., 162 
F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D.Cal. 2016) (No. 15-cv-04450). 
28. Id. at 22.  
29. Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 5-7, Sud v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D.Cal.2017) (No. 3:15-cv-
03783).  
30. Dadush, supra note 3. 
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to the likelihood that the organization will change its practices 
because of its disclosure obligations).   
While different information strategies may be equivalent in the 
information function, they potentially vary significantly in the 
organizational change function. This latter function relates to how the 
information is transmitted to the public. Not all information 
mechanisms are equally effective in the organizational change function 
even if they are comparable in the information function. Moreover, 
the effectiveness of the organization function of an information 
mechanism potentially varies according to the industry, corporation, 
and market characteristics.   
The way we regulate information in the supply chain has 
consequences for the likelihood that a brand corporation will exercise 
its capacity to detect and deter harm in the supply chain or the 
organizational change function. Not all information transmission 
regulatory strategies are equal when it comes to this function. Instead, 
it is quite likely that each of these strategies imposes different levels 
of brand costs on a corporation, thereby applying varying levels of 
pressure to detect and deter wrongdoing. The strategy we choose 
should be the one that imposes a sufficient level of brand cost on the 
corporation to incentivize it to do something about the conditions in 
the supply chain.   
An optimal information mechanism should incentivize Acme or 
another information intermediary to deter harm, not just disclose 
information. Acme may not take many steps to deter harm, however, 
because it could derive significant benefits from the wrongdoing 
committed by Overseas Seller, benefits that exceed those captured by 
Overseas Supplier. For those reasons, Acme may have more, not less, 
incentive to participate in wrongdoing in the supply chain. For 
example, imagine that Acme’s supply chain is notorious for incidents 
of environmental damage despite local laws prohibiting it. Let x 
represent the value Acme obtains for products made that cause 
environmental damage and y represent the value that Overseas 
Supplier obtains for the same products. When x > y, Acme has very 
little incentive to deter or desist Overseas Supplier from causing 
environmental damage. 
However, that is only part of the picture. Payoffs are relative.  
Even if x > y, Acme has an incentive to deter environmental damage 
when the costs of environmental damage exceed x.  The most obvious 
cost to Acme is brand damage as a result of association with 
environmental damage. Many transnational corporations invest 
considerable resources in their brand and its management. Brand is 
the primary product made by Acme. Brand also ensures that the 
exchange between Buyer and Overseas Seller occurs. As such, brand 
(or reputational capital) remains front and center for transnational 
corporations. When that brand damage, z, exceeds x, it is in Acme’s 
interest to deter environmental damage in its supply chain. Critically, 
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z is not static;31 instead, as discussed below, it may vary with the 
regulatory regime we apply to Acme. 
Different types of regulatory responses to supply chain behavior 
could possibly impose different levels of brand damage. Consider three 
types of regulatory responses: mandatory disclosures, government 
investigation, or civil litigation. Each of these may inform the public 
that Acme’s supply chain involves child labor and this revelation will 
lead to “brand damage.” Brand damage may differ, however, for all 
three responses. Some responses may exert a greater level of damage 
than the others. For example, stakeholders may react more badly to 
news of Acme’s inadequate due diligence regarding environmental 
damage when it involves a civil lawsuit than when Acme discloses it 
through its mandatory non-financial disclosures.  
What supports the belief that these different strategies exert 
different levels of reputational damage? This is an empirical question 
(not explored here) but some facts indicate that the extent of brand 
damage may vary with the mechanism for information dissemination. 
First, most people learn about corporate misconduct through the news 
media (or, now, social media). But not all information is equally news 
worthy.  The media picks up some stories over others, so the way that 
information gets out matters.32  A mandatory corporate disclosure or 
press release acknowledging deficient human rights due diligence is 
unlikely to prove as equally newsworthy as a lawsuit or government 
investigation alleging the same. The greater the newsworthiness, the 
more likely that the media will cover it and that more people will 
hear about it. And the more people who hear it, the greater risk that 
they will re-evaluate their perceptions of the corporation implicated in 
the wrong doing: brand damage. 
The type of information mechanism does not only affect the 
extent of information dissemination but also the frame through which 
we understand it. The media influences how we perceive the 
information it shares and our resulting  views on the corporation at 
issue: “[I]n performing its functions of informing, highlighting, and 
framing, the media presents market participants with information 
that affects impression formation and the legitimation of firms.”33  
 
31. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309-11 (2004) 
(explaining the cost-benefit analysis facing gatekeepers). 
32. See RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES 
AND LIMITS 194 (2015) (explaining why the media is “more likely to 
cover the press release about a lawsuit than a press release about legal 
claims not backed by a lawsuit”). 
33. Timothy G. Pollock & Violina P. Rindova, Media Legitimation Effects 
in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 631, 632 
(2003).  
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By deciding factors such as the length of a story or its frequency, 
the media affects public perceptions regarding which organizations’ 
behavior most warrants their attention.34 Media coverage also has an 
affective aspect related to tone and feeling about various 
organizations and influences the perception of organizations. 
Therefore, if the media (mainstream, social, etc) react differently to 
the regulatory strategy employed (disclosure, litigation, investigation), 
then those differences influence how people view information 
regarding supply chain conduct and impacts the extent of brand 
damage.  
Second, self-disclosures by Acme could decrease the extent of 
brand damage because of the “stealing thunder” effect: a corporation 
facing imminent negative publicity could reduce the effect of that 
publicity on its reputation through self-disclosure instead of waiting 
for a third-party to share it with the public.35 The availability of 
information explains why “stealing thunder” works.36  When things 
are rare, we tend to value them more and want them more.37 This 
holds true for information as well.38 If a corporation remains silent 
following a crisis, “crisis-information” becomes rare, enhancing the 
public’s demand for more information and the importance they attach 
to the information when it finally emerges (usually from a third 
party).39 A corporation in crisis can decrease the demand and salience 
of crisis information by contributing to the supply of it through its 
own self-disclosures.40 Although mandated disclosures are not the  
34. Craig E. Carroll & Maxwell McCombs, Agenda-setting Effects of 
Business News on the Public’s Images and Opinions about Major 
Corporations, 6 CORP. REPUTATION. REV. 36, 37 (2003). 
35. An-Sofie Claeys, Verolien Cauberghe, & Mario Pandelaere, Is old news 
no news ? The impact of self-disclosure by organizations in crisis, 69 J. 
BUS. RES. 3963, 3964 (2016). 
36. See id. (describing impact of “stealing thunder” on self-disclosure). 
37. See id. at 3964-65 (discussing “commodity theory”). 
38. See id. at 3964 (“If the commodity is information, people may not only 
desire to read scarce information more and thus devote more attention 
to the message. Scarce information may also be more likely to impact 
people’s evaluation of the position in the message than would be the 
case if the information would not be scarce.”). 
39. See id. at 3965 (discussing impact of crisis on information and self-
disclosure). 
40. See id. at 3968 (“The results show that when an organization self-
discloses a crisis, both the attention to negative publicity and the 
relation of this attention to post-crisis reputation are low, irrespective of 
the level of crisis involvement. So, if an organization reveals a crisis, 
consumers will neither feel inclined to read subsequent negative 
publicity, nor will they let such an attack influence their opinion about 
the organization in crisis, even when their involvement with the crisis is 
high.”). 
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same as voluntary self-disclosures, the research on crisis 
communication suggests that information transmitted by the 
corporation may not have as much of a negative impact on the 
corporation’s reputation compared to when that information is 
transmitted by a third-party. This suggests that information from 
government investigation and civil lawsuits may exert greater brand 
costs. 
If true that mandatory disclosure, government investigation, or 
civil lawsuit exert different levels of brand damage (z1, z2, and z3, 
respectively) on Acme, then we should pick the strategy that 
outweighs x.  In other words, the benefit that Acme derives from 
wrongdoing is not the only factor that will determine whether it 
deters Overseas Supplier in the commission of that wrongdoing.  
Instead, it will deter Overseas Supplier so long as z > x.41  Z is not 
static; instead, it changes based on the type of regulatory response 
offered. We need to choose the strategy that causes Acme’s brand 
damage to exceed any value it derives from the wrongdoing. Which 
strategy accomplishes that may depend on context, varying with the 
corporation, its key stakeholders, nature of the supply chain, type of 
wrongdoing, and benefits it derives from wrongdoing, among other 
factors.   
The essential point remains: the optimal information mechanism 
should ensure that z > x. It should ensure that the choice of 
regulatory strategy (mandatory disclosure, investigation, or litigation) 
leads to a level of brand damage that outweighs the level of benefit 
that Acme derives from permitting the wrongdoing in its supply 
chain. It is an empirical question whether that would be accomplished 
through mandatory disclosure, investigation, or litigation. We can 
improve the likelihood that Acme will deter wrongdoing in the supply 
chain by changing the costs that it faces for that wrongdoing. And 
those costs should help determine the regulatory strategy that we 
adopt.  
Of course, z is not costless either. Different regulatory strategies 
require different levels of public (and even private) resources. All 
things being equal, we will most likely prefer the least costly 
regulatory strategy that will still lead to z > x.  However, that 
strategy varies among different corporations and supply chains 
because the value of z will change based on a number of factors that 
vary among supply chains and corporations. 
 
 
41. See Coffee, supra note 31, at 318 (discussing factors that deter 
corporations). 
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Conclusion 
It is no secret that brand has power.  We gravitate towards some 
products over others because of the power of the swoosh or the apple. 
But with that power comes great responsibility. At the least, this 
responsibility involves informing consumers of the nature of the 
exchange they are entering and the risks that are involved. It also 
involves a responsibility to the parties at the other end of the supply 
chain. Their lives are impacted by the choices transnational 
corporations make concerning their brand. Therefore, it is fitting that 
brand vulnerability should supply the lever by which to incentivize 
transnational corporations to disclose and improve conditions in 
supply chains.  
 
